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 The cost of unrestricted dissemination of government information to the 
U.S.’s safety and security has been a topic of heated debate since September 11, 
2001.  The risks of dissemination seem to have skyrocketed in this age of terrorist 
attacks.  However, the U.S. faced similar risks after World War II, when the 
secret of the atom bomb required close protection.  Congress can learn from the 
process that the U.S. government went through to pass the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946 during a similar time of national stress and fear, and work to pass laws 
regulating the dissemination of information to the public.  In the absence of 
legislative guidance, agencies have been left to restrict information as they think 
is best, with inconsistent and disastrous results. 
  
 4 
 
Rarely in the history of this nation have the American people been 
confronted with a problem which is as complex, as multi-faceted, as the 
present problem of security of information [1, p. 9]. 
 
In many ways, Americans and the U.S. government are facing a 
completely new threat since September 11, 2001: a threat that requires new 
responses from both individuals and the government.  The George W. Bush 
administration has responded to this threat with military force, administrative 
reorganization and reprioritization, and with restriction on freedoms--including 
freedom of access to government information--for reasons of national security.  
The profoundly shocking image of commercial airliners crashing into the World 
Trade Center towers and the Pentagon created a sense that all bets are off, that 
terrible things can happen at any time to anyone, and that we need to give up 
some of the freedoms we have taken for granted in order to guarantee our safety.   
 However, how different is this sense of danger in a world out of control 
from the sense of danger Americans experienced early in the Cold War, when 
Soviet Communists were supposedly recruiting sympathetic Americans to pass 
information about U.S. secrets, schoolchildren were drilled in what to do if a 
nuclear bomb fell on their neighborhood and homeowners built bomb shelters 
stocked with bottled water and canned goods?  Is the perceived hatred of Arab 
extremists for America any greater than the perceived hatred of Soviet 
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Communists was?  Weart’s description of the American public’s reaction to the 
dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima seems remarkably contemporary:  
 
The public simply felt that the ground had fallen away under them.  One 
element in this was the realization, which struck many people right from 
the first news, that at some point in the foreseeable future no city on earth 
would be safe.  A related element, harder to pin down in factual concerns, 
was best expressed in a famous editorial by Norman Cousins: “The fear of 
irrational death…has burst out of the subconscious and into the conscious, 
filling the mind with primordial apprehensions.”  The old sense of security 
was lost; something unimaginable had come into the everyday world to 
stay [2, p. 106]. 
 
Certainly it is harder in many ways to deal with amorphous terrorist organizations 
whose members are perfectly willing to die than to deal with a foreign 
government as the U.S. did during the Cold War.  The Internet has also 
transformed access to all kinds of information.  However, the risks of disclosing 
government information are the same in either case: some government 
information, in the hands of persons or governments hostile to the United States 
and its citizens, can be used for great harm.  This risk has fueled government 
attempts to increase secrecy and to control access to information for decades, not 
just since September 11, 2001.   
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The quote at the beginning of this article, published at the beginning of the 
Cold War in 1949, captures the current dilemma as well as the problems faced 
after World War II.  As a Washington Post reporter pointed out a few months 
after September 11, U.S. officials are concerned that terrorists are using publicly 
available government information to plan their attacks [3].  Likewise, Congress 
and the Atomic Energy Commission were very concerned that information about 
the U.S. nuclear weapons program be kept out of Soviet hands during the Cold 
War.   
Because the risks and concerns about publicly available information are 
similar, examining how access to sensitive government information was handled 
at the beginning of the Cold War could provide policymakers with a model for 
handling access to information during the War on Terrorism.  The 79
th
 Congress 
approached its information policy crisis very differently than the 107
th
 Congress 
did in 2001: it directly addressed the problem of security of information, and 
although it moved quickly to protect the U.S.’s nuclear secrets, it took the time to 
consider a variety of solutions and to talk to experts and affected parties before 
passing the Atomic Energy Act.  This paper will compare the history and 
information provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 with the PATRIOT Act 
and the Homeland Security Act, both passed shortly after September 11, and then 
discuss the consequences of current information policy on the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and on access to its information. 
A broad range of government information has been inaccessible since 
September 2001, but because information about atomic energy has been a focal 
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point of information policy several times during the last sixty years it is an 
instructive point of comparison over time.  Since the Manhattan Project in the 
early 1940s, which culminated in the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, Japan, Congress and the executive branch have struggled with how 
to keep scientific and technical information about U.S. nuclear capabilities out of 
the hands of hostile governments and terrorist organizations.   
The physicists working on the atomic bomb during World War II were the 
first to realize that nuclear information needed to be kept secret for reasons of 
national security [4, p. 76].  The first that most Americans, including most 
government officials, heard about atomic weapons was on August 6, 1945, when 
President Truman announced that the Enola Gay had dropped an atomic bomb on 
Hiroshima, Japan.   
 
Legislative Response to Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
 
Immediately after atom bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
in August 1945, the 79
th
 Congress took up the issue of how to control the 
production of atomic weapons, including the control of information about atomic 
energy.  However, in spite of the urgency and complexity of the problem of 
access to nuclear information, Congress took the time to address the issue 
thoroughly and creatively.  Although the Soviets had fought on the same side as 
the U.S. for most of World War II, it quickly became apparent that the USSR’s 
priority was the spread of communism, by violence if necessary, at the expense of 
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capitalism and democracy. Therefore, the fact that the USSR had not built a 
nuclear bomb at the end of World War II made secrecy of the U.S.’s scientific and 
technical discoveries imperative.  After months of congressional hearings, the 
Senate Special Committee on Atomic Energy summarized the situation in the 
spring of 1946 as follows: 
 
Other countries of the world will be able to make atomic bombs.  The 
monopoly which we hold at present is precarious and certain to be short-
lived…it is clear that any nation which is relatively industrialized has a 
good chance of producing bombs within the next 5 to 15 years…. 
 
No real military defense against the atomic bomb has been devised, and 
none is in sight.  The destructiveness of atomic bombs is so engulfing that 
any defense which is not almost literally airtight will not protect our 
country against devastation. 
 
The secrets which we hold are matters of science and engineering that 
other nations can and will discover.  In large part they are secrets of 
nature, and the book of nature is open to careful, painstaking readers the 
world over. We can give ourselves a certain temporary protection by 
retaining the secrets we now have.  But that protection grows weaker day 
by day, and our research must be vigorously encouraged, supported, and 
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pursued if we are to maintain or place among other nations, to say nothing 
of retaining our advantage [5]. 
 
Suddenly the world was a much more dangerous place, and from this summary it 
is clear that the Senate Committee thought that control of information was one of 
the few possible safeguards against mass destruction.  The tension between 
secrecy and the encouragement of scientific development is also clear, however, 
and both were considered vital to U.S. interests and security.   
The first bill about atomic energy, introduced exactly one month after 
Hiroshima, provided for a board that would develop atomic energy and control its 
use [6].  This and later bills provided for a commission to monitor atomic energy 
issues [7].  Other bills asked for studies or for international prohibitions on the use 
of atomic weapons [8].   Also, on October 3, 1945, President Truman called on 
Congress to establish a commission regulating the production and use of atomic 
energy in the U.S., whose mandate would include regulating information about 
atomic energy [9]. 
These bills addressed the issue of controlling nuclear information in 
varying levels of detail.  79 H.R. 3912’s sole provision was to make it a capital 
offense to disclose information or impart knowledge that would assist in learning 
the secret of the atomic bomb; 79 H.R. 3997 was similar.  79 S. 1359 and 79 H.R. 
4014 provided for up to five years’ imprisonment and/or a $10,000 fine for 
revealing confidential atomic energy information, as defined by a board of 
military and executive branch officials (Section 5).  These bills did not distinguish 
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intent of disclosing information: innocent or inadvertent disclosures could have 
been punished as severely as willful espionage activities if these bills had passed. 
S. 1463 authorized the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to promulgate 
regulations about information security (Section 17) and provided stiff penalties 
for willful violations: up to ten years in prison and/or a $100,000 fine (section 18).  
Non-willful violations would have been grounds for dismissal from employment 
with the AEC, as well as a $500 fine and thirty days’ imprisonment.  Intent to 
jeopardize the interests of the U.S. would have brought a $300,000 fine and thirty 
years in prison (Section 19). 
H.R. 5230 contained a section titled “Guarantees of Scientific Freedom,” 
restricting the AEC from interfering with scientific activity, communication, or 
the travel of scientists outside the U.S..  However, activities concerning the 
development or use of atomic energy were required to be disclosed to the AEC. 
None of these bills passed, however.  79 S. 1717, introduced on December 
20, 1945 by Senator Brien McMahon, became the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.  
The Act was the first legislative attempt to regulate research and development into 
atomic energy in the U.S., and its stated purpose was to “direct the development 
of atomic energy in such a way as to improve the public welfare, increase the 
standard of living, strengthen free competition in private enterprise, and promote 
world peace,” all subject to the primary objective of assuring national security [5, 
p. 9].  Discussing freedom of research in his original report about S. 1717, Senator 
McMahon stated that “…this bill is not a good bill because of the precautions it 
takes, because of the controls it establishes, because of the limitations it places on 
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free development of atomic energy.  This bill is a good bill because of the 
freedom it allows and because of the encouragements it gives to this 
development” [10]. 
The bill contained a section titled “Dissemination of Information” that 
defined “basic scientific information” as theoretical knowledge and all results 
capable of accomplishment (distinguished from the processes used to reach those 
results).  This section also provided for unfettered dissemination of basic 
scientific information and established a Board of Atomic Information to 
administer libraries and other means of dissemination, and to designate 
information as basic scientific information [11]. 
By the time S. 1717 was approved by the Special Senate Committee on 
Atomic Energy after an extensive series of hearings, this section had been retitled 
“Control of Information” and had a completely different focus:  
 
(a) Policy.  It shall be the policy of the Commission to control the 
dissemination of restricted data in such a manner as to assure the 
common defense and security.   
 
Principles to guide the AEC in disseminating information stressed sharing 
information with other nations once international safeguards were established and 
encouraging dissemination of information to encourage scientific progress.  The 
commission was authorized to publish, as well as establish libraries and 
information services.  However, this section also defined “restricted data:” a 
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concept that took atomic information out of the general classification system 
applicable to other sensitive information.  Any information in the following areas 
was automatically classified: 
 
1. The manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons 
2. The production of fissionable material 
3. The use of fissionable material in the production of power 
 
However, if the AEC determined that data could be published without adversely 
affecting national defense and security, it could be released.   
This was a drastic departure from how other national security information 
was treated.  The current system of setting criteria and procedures for 
classification in an executive order began in the Eisenhower administration, so 
classification at the end of World War II was handled by individual agencies [12, 
p. 217].  For example, in 1946 Army regulations provided that: 
 
Official matter requiring classification shall be examined, graded, and 
marked top secret, secret, confidential, or restricted.  Top secret is a 
special grading given to certain secret matter…the security aspect of 
which is paramount and whose unauthorized disclosure would cause 
exceptionally grave damage to the nation… 
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Documents, information, or matériel, the unauthorized disclosure of which 
would endanger national security, cause serious injury to the interests or 
prestige of the nation, or any governmental activity thereof, or would be of 
great advantage to a foreign nation shall be classified secret… 
 
Documents, information , or matériel, the unauthorized disclosure of 
which, while not endangering the national security, would be prejudicial to 
the interests or prestige of the nation, any governmental activity, an 
individual, or would cause administrative embarrassment, or difficulty, or 
be of advantage to a foreign nation shall be classified confidential… 
 
Documents, information, or matériel (other than top secret, secret, or 
confidential) which should not be published or communicated to anyone 
except for official purposes shall be classified restricted…[13]. 
 
Setting aside the appropriateness of the criteria described above, each piece of 
information needed to be affirmatively reviewed and classified under these and 
other similar rules; no information other than nuclear information was “born 
classified.”  Furthermore, non-nuclear information would automatically be 
declassified after the passage of a certain period of time unless affirmative action 
was taken after determining that release of the information could still be 
detrimental to national security.  There was no provision in the 1946 Act for 
restricted data to be released except by affirmative review of the AEC.  Penalties 
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for disclosing or conspiring to disclose restricted data with intent to secure an 
advantage to a foreign nation or reason to believe an advantage to a foreign nation 
will result carried stiff penalties, including imprisonment for up to 20 years and 
fines up to $20,000.   
 The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and its information provisions have not 
remained static.  By the early 1950s, the non-military uses of atomic energy were 
obvious, and the restrictions set up by the 1946 Act were impeding industrial use 
of nuclear power.  The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was Congress’s response to 
the changing information needs of government agencies, U.S. industry, and the 
international community.  The definition of restricted data was not changed, but a 
new category of information, formerly restricted data (FRD), was created so that 
the Department of Defense could have access to information about the military 
use of atomic weapons under the normal classification rules [14].  Public Law 97-
90, passed early in the Reagan administration, also modified the information 
provision of the Atomic Energy Act.  It added a category of Unclassified 
Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) that restricted access to information 
about nuclear production and utilization facility design, information about 
security measures at nuclear facilities, and previously restricted data about design, 
use or manufacture of atomic weapons if there was a “reasonable expectation” 
that the information could be used to steal, sabotage, or illegally manufacture 
nuclear weapons [15].  
 The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was far from perfect and has not 
completely stood the test of time, but by the time it passed it had been thoroughly 
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discussed, with significant input from all affected parties inside and outside the 
government.  It attempted to balance the needs of scientists for freedom to 
disseminate their research results and the needs of the military for secrecy about 
U.S. weapons development and capabilities.  Its information dissemination 
provisions were specific and concrete.  It required reports to Congress on how the 
Act’s information restrictions were being applied and provided for judicial review 
of agency decisions. 
The category of UCNI added to the Atomic Energy Act during the Reagan 
administration is just one example of information that is not classified, but is 
inaccessible to most citizens, federal employees, and government contractors.  
This information has many names, including “sensitive national security 
information,” critical infrastructure information,” and the most common, 
“sensitive but unclassified information.”  Many of these terms have a history that 
long predates September 11, but the use of these terms to justify withholding 
information after the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks has placed them 
under increased scrutiny.  UCNI is one of the few examples in this category that 
was established by legislation: often information is withheld on the basis of 
agency rules, memos from the Office of Management and Budget, or even memos 
within agencies [16].   
 
Legislative Response to September 11, 2001    
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Just eight days after September 11, Attorney General John Ashcroft 
delivered proposed legislation to a group of senators that eventually became the 
PATRIOT Act [17].  The House Judiciary Committee held the first hearings on 
the proposal on September 24, and several more hearings were held during the 
following two weeks, before a bill had even been introduced.   
 On October 23, 2001, Rep. Sensenbrenner introduced H.R. 3162, which 
became the PATRIOT Act [18].  Briefly, most of its provisions related to 
increased surveillance authority for law enforcement agencies, immigration 
control, and to attempts to cut off funding streams to terrorist organizations.  
Criminal penalties were increased for terrorism offenses and information sharing 
and cooperation between law enforcement agencies was increased.  There is no 
provision in H.R. 3162, or in the final PATRIOT Act, that directly addresses 
public access to information, as the original Atomic Energy Act did.  The 
PATRIOT Act became law within two months of September 11 and three days 
after it was introduced, on October 26, 2001 [19]. 
 Although the PATRIOT Act had no provisions directly affecting public 
access to government information, the Homeland Security Act addresses this 
issue in a section titled “Homeland Security Information Sharing Act” [20].  
There were three bills with this title in the 107
th
 Congress, but the provisions of 
the Homeland Security Act are most similar to 107 S. 2887, introduced by Sen. 
Dianne Feinstein on August 1, 2002 but never considered by a Senate committee 
or the full Senate.  Like the PATRIOT Act’s information provisions, the 
Homeland Security Information Sharing Act’s main focus is on information 
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sharing among state, local and federal law enforcement agencies.  However, 
Section 892 directs the President to establish procedures and standards for sharing 
sensitive unclassified information that apply to all federal agencies [20, §892].  
The other two bills titled “Homeland Security Information Sharing Act,” H.R. 
3825 (introduced February 28, 2002) and H.R. 4598 (introduced April 25, 2002) 
do not address the issue of establishing and standardizing definitions of sensitive 
unclassified information and procedures for its dissemination [21].  The 
Homeland Security Act was signed by the President on November 25, 2002.   
At this point, the issue of defining sensitive but unclassified information 
left the legislature’s hands.  In an executive order signed on July 29, 2003, 
President Bush delegated the functions assigned to him in section 892 of the 
Homeland Security Act to the Secretary of Homeland Security, except for the 
responsibility to ensure that the rules regarding information sharing apply to all 
federal agencies [22].  Currently the only sign that this directive is a priority for 
the Homeland Security Agency is an item in the Homeland Security Agency’s 
agenda for the second half of 2005 stating that identifying, safeguarding and 
sharing sensitive homeland security information is in the proposed rule stage [23].  
Therefore, if the rulemaking process goes smoothly and if these Homeland 
Security Agency regulations apply to the entire government, there will be 
procedures and criteria in place shortly before the fifth anniversary of September 
11.   
Meanwhile, a December 2005 memorandum from President Bush citing 
Section 892 of the Homeland Security Act as his authority directed that a program 
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manager in the office of the Director of National Intelligence collect information 
about existing information sharing procedures used by executive departments, and 
to create common standards for an “information sharing environment” across 
government.  The Director of National Intelligence is also directed by this 
memorandum to inventory agencies’ definitions and procedures for dealing with 
sensitive but unclassified information and to develop a definition and procedures 
that will apply across government, in coordination with other cabinet-level 
officials.  All of this work is directed to be finished within 90 days of the 
memorandum, in mid-March, 2006 [24].   
 
Executive Branch Actions Restricting Public Access to Information After 
September 11 
 
In this vacuum of legislative leadership about public access to 
information, chaos has reigned.  Six months after the attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon, Feinberg wrote that “the traditional concerns for 
balancing access, privacy and secrecy are not in play.  Many key decisions are 
being made by members of the law enforcement and military communities, either 
with little experience in information policy issues or with institutional 
predilections toward secrecy, and by a small group of executive branch officials 
who have a history of favoring restrictions on government information” [25]. 
 Because Congress did not address public access to information in its 
legislative response to September 11, executive branch agencies were left to make 
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decisions based on existing laws like the Freedom of Information Act, U.S. Code 
Title 44 (which describes the types of government information that should be 
distributed to depository libraries), and the current executive order establishing 
rules for classified information.  Government agencies almost immediately started 
taking down documents from their web sites, and in some cases removed whole 
sections of the sites to keep information out of terrorists’ hands.  For example, in 
February of 2002 over 6,600 technical reports were withdrawn from circulation 
by the National Technical Information Service as part of an ongoing security 
review [26].  The U.S. Geological Survey required depository libraries to destroy 
a CD-ROM containing water data in October 2001 [27]. 
 The first general and official information policy guidance that agencies 
received after the attacks was on October 12, 2001, when Attorney General John 
Ashcroft issued a memorandum describing the policy executive branch agencies 
should follow when processing requests under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) [28].  The most striking change from previous FOIA policy was a default 
policy of non-disclosure: while the memorandum asserted the importance of 
FOIA, agency officials were assured that the Justice Department would back them 
up in their decisions not to release documents as long as the denial was based on a 
statutory exemption to release described in FOIA. 
The second piece of guidance agencies received came in March 2002 from 
White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card in the form of a memo [29].  Card 
stressed agencies’ responsibility to “safeguard” information about weapons of 
mass destruction and “other information that could be misused to harm the 
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security of our nation and the safety of our people.”  A second memorandum from 
the Information Security Oversight Office and the Office of Information and 
Privacy of the Justice Department included sensitive but unclassified information 
specifically in the category of information that must be safeguarded, but did not 
define this term other than to say that it does not meet the criteria for 
classification [30]. 
The Nuclear Regulator Commission’s (NRC) actions to protect its 
information from terrorists who may be planning attacks on power plants are a 
good indicator of the ambiguity of this advice, especially in contrast with the 
handling of atomic energy information by its predecessor agency, the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC), after World War II.  The NRC inherited a strong 
tradition of public access to its unclassified information from the AEC.  Before 
the advent of internet access to government information, this access was provided 
through its public document rooms, located near power plants, as well as through 
the National Technical Information Service and the Federal Depository Library 
Program.  Once the NRC established a web presence, it included an online public 
reading room on its website and closed most of its physical reading rooms.   
Despite this tradition of openness and despite the fact that much of its 
information is “born classified” as provided in the Atomic Energy Act and 
therefore would seem unlikely to be overlooked in the classification process, the 
NRC took down its entire web site on October 11, 2001 for security review.  The 
site was reposted later in the month, minus information the public uses to 
participate in NRC proceedings [31].  In early 2002, information that was 
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previously available on the NRC web site was still being reviewed and returned to 
the site only if it did not contain sensitive information [32].  In March of 2002, the 
Superintendent of Documents, who administers the Federal Depository Library 
Program (FDLP), informed depository library directors that the NRC was 
reviewing the microfiche that had been distributed to depository libraries and 
might be requesting that some reports be withdrawn from libraries [33]. 
 On April 4, 2002, after Ashcroft’s and Card’s memos had been issued, an 
internal NRC Action Memorandum finally provided guidance on releasing 
potentially sensitive information.  The memorandum provided that information 
generated by NRC or its contractors will be withheld if it could provide a clear 
and significant benefit to an adversary in a potential attack.  General information 
will not be withheld, and information that was widely available on the date of the 
memorandum will not be reviewed [34].   
An incident during August 2003, described in a letter from Rep. Henry 
Waxman (D-CA) to Christopher Shays, the Chairman of the Committee on 
Government Reform’s Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, 
and International Relations, shows the result of NRC’s tendency toward secrecy 
combined with confusion about procedures and criteria for restricting access to 
information.  The NRC staged a mock attack on a nuclear power plant during the 
summer of 2003 and reported to Congress that the attack was repelled 
successfully.  The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) wrote a letter to the 
NRC Chairman detailing problems with the mock attack and posted the letter on 
their website.  The NRC demanded that the entire letter be removed from public 
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access, although it was based on publicly available information, but after several 
months of correspondence and the threat of litigation the NRC identified specific 
information in the POGO letter that it considered sensitive (although none of it 
was classified) and the report was revised [35]. 
 In spite of this cautious approach to releasing information, the NRC’s 
electronic reading room was taken down again on October 25, 2004 because a 
private citizen and a watchdog group found information they felt could help 
terrorists.  About 700,000 documents were removed from public access [36].  The 
NRC planned to review 5,000 documents per day, completing the review process 
by June of 2005 and reposting any documents the agency did not consider 
sensitive [37].  In February of 2005, the NRC issued a proposed rule codifying the 
many internal orders about access to information that had been issued since the 
first one in April 2002, and creating an additional category of sensitive 
unclassified information [38].  Critics are concerned that the new rules would 
conceal information that enables the public to participate in discussions about 
safety at nuclear power plants and participate in holding the NRC accountable for 
its management of the nuclear power program [39].  For example, in March of 
2005, Rep. Edward Markey (D-MA) asked the NRC’s inspector general to study 
whether the NRC’s actions prevent the public from accessing documents that do 
not pose a security risk [40].   
 
Discussion 
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 No one can deny that the information landscape has changed since 
September 2001, or that the Internet created new challenges related to sensitive 
information.  But much of the chaos over the last five years has been due to lack 
of authoritative guidance on these issues.  The laws that govern information 
dissemination were crafted in an era of tangible formats, where even the most 
widely distributed government information was still only available in libraries. 
The Andrew Card and Attorney General memorandums issued within six months 
of September 11 are examples of this, relying on the Freedom of Information Act, 
which is a product of the 1960s and 1970s, to guide agencies in releasing 
information on their Internet sites.   
Without strong guidance from Congress, agencies like the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission are left to decide on their own what should be available 
to the public, and the realities of government almost guarantee that they will err 
on the side of caution.  Furthermore, the fact that many officials untrained in 
information management are setting information policy leads to vague guidance 
that can be difficult to apply to individual situations.  Policies are also likely to 
contain large areas where discretion can or must be used, making the policies 
flexible but also leaving decision makers open to criticism, scapegoating, or even 
legal liability.  Halchin describes information dissemination policies developed by 
the Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and National 
Archives and Records Administration jointly with the Department of Justice [41]. 
While none of them are the same, all give officials wide discretion in withholding 
information based on their own judgment of the risk of disclosure.  Herman 
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describes a possible model policy, issued by the United States Geological Survey 
in December 2002, that provides for multiple levels of review before withholding 
information and acknowledges the complexity of security concerns by providing 
for a range of security restrictions [42]. 
What if NRC information about nuclear power plant vulnerabilities or 
USGS water table data could be tied to a terrorist attack?  The agency that 
released the data would be blamed, certainly in the media and most likely in 
Congress and by the President, because it was the decision of someone at the 
agency that the information should be released.  This threat is much more 
immediate to an agency official than the risks that arise from withholding 
information.  This balance of risks is a recipe for conservative information 
dissemination, because agency officials will understandably do whatever is 
necessary to protect the public and limit their agencies’ political vulnerability.  
However, Halchin also points out the irony that the same medium that makes 
information available to terrorists also enables the government to share 
information about preventing and responding to terrorist attacks [41].  Further 
illustrating this irony, Dahl discusses the risk management plans that companies 
submit to the Environmental Protection Agency, their removal from the Internet, 
and the likelihood that denying terrorists access to this information about 
chemical releases and their consequences will deny citizens information about 
how to respond to a public health emergency [43]. 
 But imagine an alternate scenario, where the NRC, USGS, and all other 
agencies are following generally applicable information dissemination policies 
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established by law and enforceable by the federal courts, as the information 
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act are.  Not only would agencies all be 
following the same rules, the public and the librarians who serve the public would 
know what should be available to them.  Agency officials could release 
information with some confidence that if they are following the law they are not 
harming public safety or risking their careers and the careers of everyone working 
under them.  If confusion arose about how to apply the law or situations 
developed that were not considered when the law originally passed, the courts 
could interpret the law or Congress could amend it.  And if agencies do not follow 
the law, the courts could enforce it.   
 This scenario is based on junior high social studies rather than nuclear 
physics, but it has not come to pass.  Congress declined an opportunity to legislate 
this issue by directing the President to define “sensitive but unclassified” 
information, and the President then passed the ball to the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence.  DHS is only one 
agency and a new one at that, and cannot make rules that have the same authority 
and enforceability as laws even if it does pick up the ball.  The Director of 
National Intelligence is also a newly created position, in an area of government 
that is famous for its unwillingness to share information.  Both DHS and the 
Director of National Intelligence are also as vulnerable as any other agency or 
official to becoming a scapegoat if information winds up in the wrong hands.  The 
ball needs to be passed back to Congress, whose job is to develop and enforce 
policy decisions. 
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 However, we are not living in a social studies class and the political 
realities of the fight against terrorism complicate these issues endlessly.  Two 
years after her initial assessment that key decisions about access to information 
were being made in an uncoordinated way by officials with no background in 
information policy, Feinberg wrote that repeated that policy about access to 
government information is still in a state of flux, and with no bipartisan agreement 
in Congress about directions for information policy.  Furthermore, access to 
government information is not at the top of any member’s legislative agenda [44].  
President Bush may be able to shape the discussion of this issue in Congress if the 
Director of National Intelligence determines that legislation is necessary to 
implement whatever information sharing policies and procedures are established 
pursuant to the president’s December 2005 memorandum.  Given the well-
documented viewpoint of this administration that presidential power needs to be 
restored to what it was before FOIA passed, it is unlikely that any proposed 
legislation would contain provisions regarding judicial or congressional oversight.  
Congress needs to take back the initiative and pass a bill about access to 
government information that provides specific guidance for reasonable 
withholding of sensitive information and oversight of agency decisions by the 
legislative and judicial branches of government.  If the Department of Homeland 
Security compiles and evaluates executive branch departments’ definitions and 
policies concerning sensitive but unclassified information, this evaluation could 
be a starting point for Congressional staff to draft legislation and schedule 
hearings that include affected non-governmental groups and individuals rather 
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than relying entirely on agency input, as President Bush’s most recent 
memorandums do. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was not a perfect piece of 
legislation and no one could say that the Cold War was the golden age of access 
to information, Congress’s reasoned and thoughtful response to the problem of 
access to nuclear information was effective and a similar process could be 
effective now.  Much information has already been lost to agency web site purges 
and other recent government information has never been released, but it is better 
to have principles, rules, and reporting structures for agency decisions late than 
not at all.  Librarians, scientists, community activists, and other interested parties 
could shape the legislation via congressional hearings and communications with 
the members of Congress who are accountable to them.   
Congress could set up the mechanisms for all agencies to report and be 
held accountable for their decisions to withhold information.  Agencies could 
make decisions based on the legislation that Congress passes, with some level of 
confidence that they were not releasing information inappropriately.  Ultimately, 
while information may not be as accessible as it was before September 11, it 
would be possible for citizens, scientists, and the librarians who serve them to 
know what should be available and what should be inaccessible.   
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While agency officials’ fears of releasing sensitive information are 
justified in the current policy environment, they need to be balanced with citizens’ 
need to know what their government is doing and their right to have access to 
information produced with tax dollars.  The best place for that balance to be 
struck is in Congress, where accountability to citizens is most direct and where 
the expertise and authority lie to make decisions that apply to all of government 
and to hold agencies accountable for how they apply these decisions.  This is not 
to say that there is an easy or simple way to protect sensitive information while 
maintaining the openness of government that is necessary for democracy to thrive, 
but it is certainly no less possible to strike this balance now that it was in 1946. 
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